Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983

Russell Acton, Andrew Acton And Carol E. Acton v. J. B. Deliran, A
Utah Corporation; Gerald House; Era Realty Center; Daryl Yates
And Marydon Yate : Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Russell Acton
Andrew Acton And Carol E. Acton

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Jeffrey Oritt; Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Acton v. Deliran, No. 19300 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4747

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RUSSELL ACTON, ANDREW ACTON
and CAROL E. ACTON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.
J. B. DELIRAN, a Utah
corporation; GERALD
HOUSE; ERA REALTY CENTER;
DARYL YATES and MARYDON YATES,
husband and wife,

Case No.

Defendants-Respondents,
and Cross-Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS RUSSELL ACTON
ANDREW ACTON AND CAROL E. ACTON
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT
OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE CHRISTIAN RONNOW, JUDGE
Jeffrey Oritt
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Third Floor Mony Plaza
424 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Hans Q. Chamberlain
110 North Main, Suite G
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
ERA Realty Center
Patrick H. Fenton
154 North Main Street
Cedar City, Utah
84720
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
and Cross-Appellants J. B. Deliran
and Jerald House

TABLE OF

",HLE

OF

AUTHORITIES

;

OF

THE

rr;

rJJSPUS!';'IQr;

1 OF

•.•..••••.•••.••.•.••••.•••.

NATUHE

OF '.i'HE CASE

..•..••.•••.•

LO\IEH COUET

SuUGdT Oil
:,".'

CONTENTS

A?PEA'..,

FACTS

ii
1

2

•••••••••••••••••••••••••

2

.••.....•.•.•••.•••..••..••...

2

5
I.

I I .

"he evidence does not support a verdict
that thete were no fraudulent misrepresentations or mutual mistake made and
that the lanu sale contract between
appellants and defendants-respondents
J. B. Deliran and Gerald House should
oe upheld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

Under Utah Law, the trial court erred in
not entering a directed verdict, or
Judgment not withstanding the verdict,
because there is no substantial evidence
to support the Jury verdict ............ .

18

(!cJhCLUSIOf:

. . . . . . • • . • . . . • . . • . • • . • . • . • . • . • • • . • . • • • •

20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

v. Gregg,

P.2d 693

r , , r ._. . r< ;j '/ f
(1(761;

(Ut. 1982

ri i r
ha r k e ':: s , l Y Ut • 2 d 3 3 9 , 4 31 P • 2 d
•.•.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

1 1

18
18-19

IN TH[ SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RUSSELL ACTON, ANDREW ACTON
ana CAROL E. ACTON,
Pla1ntitfs-Appellants,

vs.
J. B. DELIRAN, a Utah
corporation; GERALD
HOUSE; ERA REALTY CENTER;
DARYL YATES and MARYDON YATES,
husband and wife,

case No. 19300

Defendants-Respondents,
and Cross-Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Russell Acton, Andrew Acton and
carol E. Acton,

(hereafter referred to as "appellants")

JUSt1fiably relied upon misrepresentations, made either
mistaKenly or recklessly, by defendant-respondent ERA Realty
Center ("ERA") prior to appellants' purchase of a small
building and surrounding property in Cedar City, Utah.

The

concerned the legality of a water hook-up on
the property.

As a result of ERA's misrepresentations,

appellants purchased a building and property with no legal
water hook-up on it, anr1 subsequently learned that it would
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cost appellants almost as much as the purchase price to acquire
a legal water hook-up.

Appellants are entitlec to have the

real estate contract with defendants-respondents J. B. Deliran
ano Geralc Hoese rescinded and recover

them all payments

appellants have made on the property since they purchased it.
DISPOSITIOI' IN LO\IE:R COURT
Following a Jury trial on appellants' claims for
recision based upon fraudulent misrepresentations and mutual
mistake, the JUry found that the real estate contract between
appellants and J. B. Deliran and Gerald House should be upheld,
and dismissed appellants' claims against them and ERA.

The

Court denied appellants' motions for a directed verdict and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, ano entered a Judgment in
accordance with the jury verdict.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the district court's
Judgment on the grounds that, as a matter of law, there is no
reasonable basis in the evidence to Justity the veraict of the
Jury against appellants ana in favor of dEfenciants-reponaents.
S':'f>.TE:·.Etl':' OF FACTS
In or about February, 1931, appellant Andrew Acton
went to defendant-respondent ERA for the

of f1nainn a

building and property in w'1ich to estatd1sh an iicto
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with his brother, appellant Russell Acton.

He was shown some

rroperty by one of the ERA sales agents, Audrey Lebbon.

One of

those properties was the property at issue in this lawsuit, at
the time owned by Daryl and Marydon Yates.

Andrew Acton

reJected the property at the time because of the run down
condition of the building on the property.

some time later, in

June, 1981, Andrew looked at the property again with Mrs.
Lebbon.

At this time the property had been purchased, and

relisted with ERA, by defendants-respondents J. B. Deliran
("Deliran") and Gerald House ("House") although this fact was
not

known to appellants.

At the time of the first visit,

in February, 1981, Andrew was shown a description of the Yates'
property, a "listing,• which stated that there was "water in
building."

During the June visit to the property, Mrs. Lebbon

again showed the Yates listing to Andrew, although the property
belonged at the time to Deliran, and ran water from a
frost-free spigot on the property.

Subsequent to the June,

1981 visit to the property by Mrs. Lebbon and Andrew, a visit
to the property was made by Mrs. Lebbon, Andrew Acton, Russell
Acton, Russell's wife, Gail, and Robert Behunin, the Cedar City
inspector.
Shortly after that meeting, the appellants went to
ERA's office in cedar City, Utah and had a telephone conference
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call with defendant-respondent House, the principal of J. B.
Deliran.

The result of the conference was that the appellants

signed an Earnest Money Agreement, drafted by Mrs. Lebbon, and
the closing on the property was to be held on or about August
12, 1981.

Shortly prior to the closing, appellants hao a survey
done on their property by David Grimshaw.

The closing on the

property was held as scheduled, on a Friday.

Russell and

Andrew Acton spent the weekend cleaning up the building on the
property and went in the following Monday morning to see the
water superintendent of Cedar City.

At that time the water

superintendent tolo appellants that there was an illegal water
connection on the property, that the water in the building was
being piped in improperly, and it would cost the appellants
well over $20,000.00 to have a legal water connection
established at the property.
for

property had been purchased

$23,800.00.

The Actons immediately went to Mrs. Lebbon's office at
ERA and explained the situation to her.

She was surprised and

promised to cio all she could to rectify the situation.

She had

her broker, Brad Smoots, call Gerald House ano see if he woulu
rescind the sale.

Mr. House refusea.

Appellants looked into

other alternatives for obtaining water, without success.
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brought an action in the Fifth District court for
Iron County, State of Utah, alleging fraudulent
m1srepresentat1on and mutual mistake and praying for recision
of the real estate contract.
The matter went to trial and was heard by a jury on
hovember 8, 9, and 10, 1983 before the Honorable Christian
Ronnow, circuit court Judge, sitting by designation.
The jury returned their verdict that the contract
between appellants and defendants-respondents should not be
rescinded.

Appellants' counsel, who had moved for a directed

verdict subsequent to defendants-respondents' counsel resting
their case, moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Appellants' motion for directed verdict, and subsequent motion
for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, were denied by the

court.

This appeal then ensued.
ARGUMENT
I. The evidence does not support a verdict that there
were no fraudulent m1srepresentat1ons or mutual
mistake made and that the land sale contract
between appellants and defendants-respondents J. B.
Del1ran and Gerald House should be upheld.
References to the Transcript of the trial will be

designated "Tr."

References to the Transcript will only be

made to testimony before the jury, due to the nature of this
appeal.
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A. All of appellants' witnesses at trial
testified that appellants had no
notice, constructive or actual, that
the water on the property they
purchased was not a legal hook-up.
Andrew Acton's testimony to the jury remained
consistent throughout direct examination and cross examination
by two defense counsel.

Andrew testified that he and nis

brother wanted to establish an auto repair shop in Cedar City,
Utah, and pursuant to that desire, Andrew went to ERA and met
with Audrey Lebbon, one of their sales agents, some time in
February, 1981 (Tr. 172).

He told her what he needeu in a

building and property, including the need for water and sewer
hook-ups (Tr. 174).

He testified that Mrs. Lebbon took him to

the property in February of 1981, at which time he reJected the
building because of its run-down condition (Tr. 179).

He tnen

testified that, subsequent to examining the property at issue
in this case, Mrs. Lebbon took him to a prorerty in Enoch,
Utah, which was suitable to his needs but was zoned improperly
for a commercial establishment.

He and his brother attempted

to get it rezoned by the city of Enoch but were unsuccessful
(Tr. 179-180, 278).

The next time Andrew visited the property

at issue in this case with Mrs. Lebbon was in June of 1981.
They visited the property at this time with Andrew's brother,
Russell (Tr. 180-182, 279).
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Subsequent to that meeting, Mrs. Lebbon set up a
meeting between the Actons and Robert Behunin, the Cedar City
building inspector.

The Actons wanted to find out what the

building codes were and what they needed to do to get their
building up to city specifications so they could open their
business (Tr. 182-184, 282-284).

At this meeting, Mrs. Lebbon

turned on a frost-free water spigot that was in the building,
out of which water ran (Tr. 184).

Andrew further testified

that, either at the second meeting at the property with Mrs.
Lebbon and Russell, or at the third meeting at the property,
with Mrs. Lebbon, Russell, Russell's wife, Andrew and Mr.
Behunin, Mrs. Lebbon showed Andrew a copy of the listing of the
property, which indicated that there was water in the
building.

Andrew testified that the name on the listing was

Yates (Tr. 184-185, 313).

Andrew went on to testify that there

was no discussion of the legality or illegality of the water
hook-up on the property with Mr. Behunin (Tr. 185).
Subsequent to that visit, Andrew and Russell Acton
signed an Earnest Money Agreement, after talking on a
tr,iephone

conference call with Gerald House, and arranged for

a survey to be done on the property by David Grimshaw (Tr.
186-189, 285-286).

The closing on the property took place

after that, on a Friday (Tr. 192).
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The Acton brothers spent

the weekend cleaning up the debris in the building, and went in
on the following Monday to see the Cedar City water
superintendent, Theon (Bud) Bauer, about getting permits for
the building (Tr. 194-195, 288).
At that meeting, Mr. Bauer told the Actons that he
could not find any legal water hook-up on their newly purchased
property.

The Actons then asked Mr. Bauer what it would cost

to get water.

Mr. Bauer indicated that the appellants would

have to install a water main on to the public water main.

He

pointed out that the nearest available water was 2100 feet away
(Tr. 194-196).

Testimony by Andrew about the cost of getting a

legal water hook-up to the city water main was not allowed, and
later Mr. Bauer could not recall the figure he gave to the
appellants.
Subsequent to their meeting with Mr. Bauer, Russell
and Andrew went to Audrey Lebbon's office at ERA and told her
what had occurred.

She was quite surprised and told them she

would look into it (Tr. 197-198).

She pulled the listing on

the property and showea it to the Actons.
listing.

It was the Deliran

Neither Andrew nor Russell had ever seen it before,

nor had they known that the property haa changed hands since
February of 1981 (Tr. 203-204, 287-288, 291-292 ).

The Actons

subsequently went to an attorney to look at other possibilitiPs
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for getting a legal water hook-up (Tr. 198-199).

They learned

subsequently that the water that ran out of the spigot on the
property they had purchased was an illegal connection running
off of a water line used by their neighbor, Wayne Smith (Tr.
199-200).

In concluding his testimony, Andrew stated that the
Actons could not get a variance from the city in order to use
the water line that ran through their propErty from Mr. Smith's
property, the cost was prohibitive if they wished to attach
their own water line to the city water system, and appellants
d1a not consider renting the property because they would have
had to put substantial amounts of money into the building to
renovate it and no one would rent it without water (Tr.
200-202).

on cross examination, Andrew reiterated his testimony
on direct.

He denied that he and Mr. Behunin ever discussed an

illegal water connnect1on on the property (Tr. 233).

This was

later confirmed by Mr. Behunin (Tr. 407-409).
Russell Acton then testified extensively, and in his
testimony in response to direct examination and under somewhat
grueling cross examination by both defense counsel, his
testimony matched that of Andrew Acton concerning meetings with
and representations by Audrey Lebbon and Bob Behunin.
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More

important, Russell testified about the circumstances of the
survey done by David Grimshaw.

During the survey,

which

Russell Acton helped Mr. Grimshaw, Wayne Smith came over and
had some discussions with Mr. Grimshaw and Russell Acton.
Russell testified that the only discussions held between Wayne
Smith and Russell Acton had to do with property that Smith
owned that cut off the Yates property from the public highway,
and that the Actons would have to get some sort ot easement
from Smith in order to have access to the property.

At no time

did the question of legality of the \later hook-up come up in
discussions between Wayne Smith and Russell Acton (Tr. 296-299,
314-315).

carol Acton, the mother of Russell and Andrew Acton,
testified briefly.

She didn't have personal knowledge about

the events preceding tne purchase of the property but she d1d
testify that at no time during the negotiations for the
property, the visits to the property, and the subsequent
closing on the property did Andrew or Russell tell her that
there was a potential problem with the water in the building
(Tr. 329).
Auarey Lebbon, the sales agent for ERA, test1f1ea
next.

She was obviously a cr1t1cal witness in that appellants
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claimed that she was tne source of the misrepresentations about
water availability on the property.

Mrs. Lebbon's testimony

everything to which Russell and Andrew Acton had
testified previously.

She stated that on the first visit to

the property with Andrew, in February, 1981, Andrew saw the
Yates listing, stating that water was in the building.

She

also testified that she ran water out of the spigot at that
meeting (Tr. 342-343).

On the second visit, with Andrew and

Russell, she testified that she had a copy of the Yates listing
with her (Tr. 344).

She initially testified that she had to be

working from the J. 8. Deliran listing, since that was the one
that was in her office, or the current Multiple Listing Service
listing (Tr. 347), but upon being refreshed with her testimony
from her deposition, which had been taken prior to the trial,
she aamitted that she had not obtained a specific copy of the
Deliran listing, even though she knew the property had changed
hands and had been relisted.

She stated that she assumed the

terms were the same, and did not know that there were any
oifterences in the two listings (Tr. 348-350, 367-368).
Mrs. Lebbon testified that water could have been
turned on at the second visit, with Russell and Andrew, and
that the water might have been turned on during the third
visit, with Russell, Russell's wife Gail, Andrew, Mrs. Lebbon
and Robert Behunin (Tr. 345-347).
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She stated that she showed the appellants, tor the
first time, the Deliran listing which does riot say there is
water in the building, after the sale of the property.

Mrs.

Lebbon stated that the earnest money agreement, which she
drafted, did not say anything, one way or the other, about
water on the property (Tr. 358).

She then confirmed what

Andrew and Russell had said, that is, subsequent to the
closing, and to the Actons' meeting with Bud Bauer, they came
over to her office and told her that there was no legal water
connection on the property they had Just purchased.

She

further testifiea that, prior to that day, neither Andrew nor
Russell Acton had ever told her that there was a problem witl1
water on the property (Tr. 359-362).

She confirmed that the

Actons asked her to ask her broker to talk with Gerald House
about a recision of the contract.

She did so (Tr. 362-363).

Mrs. Lebbon was then subjected to intense
cross-examination and did not change her story.

Indeed,

questions were put to her by the trial court Judge, and she
testified that she knew the Actons needed water in the
building, she assured them there was water in the bu1lrl1ng,
and, although she reviewed the Deliran listing on the property
prior to the purchase of the property by the appellants, she
said she was not on notice that there was a question about the
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legality of the water hookup (Tr. 364-365, 397-399).

She

aornitteo that she faileJ to make any notation on the earnest
monej agreement about water on the premises due to an oversight
(Tr. :J87).
The appellants then called Robert Behunin, the Cedar
City Building Inspector, as the next witness.

Behunin

confirmed the testimony of Andrew and Russell Acton and Mrs.
Lebbon concerning his meeting with them at the property
subsequently purchased by the appellants.

He testified that he

saw water running out of the spigot in the building.

He

further testified that he felt there was not a water meter on
the property and that he told the Actons they would have to pay
for a connection of a water meter on the property.

He also

testified that he did not believe there was any discussion
about the legality of the water hook-up itself on the property
(Tr. 407-409).

At the time he told appellants of the need for

a water meter, he tolo them that they should go see the water
superintendent, Bud Bauer, about getting the water meter hooked
up, and that any water or sewer connections would be under the
city water department (Tr. 421).

In response to

cross-examination, Behunin stated that he knew that if there
was no water meter, the connection was illegal, but Behunin
also testified that he did not tell the appellants that the
hook-up was illegal (Tr. 422).
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The above-cited testimony represents a crystallized
view of the evidence appellants put on to show the
misrepresentations made to them prior to their purchase of the
property.

The testimony is consistent, and, indeed, almost

exactly synonymous among the various witnesses, even though the
witnesses ranged from appellants to an agent of one of the
defendants-respondents to disinterested persons.

At this point

in the trial, the testimony overwhelmingly showed reckless, or
at least mistaken, representations made concerning a critical
aspect of the property appellants wished to purchase.
B.

tjone of defendants-respondents' witnesses clearly
contraa1cted or recutted any of appellants'
witnesses' testimony.

The defendants-respondents ERA and Deliran put on
three witnesses who tried to undermine the testimony of the
witnesses put on by appellants.

The first witness, Nancy Hale,

(spelled Hail in the Transcript), was the listing agent for the
property purchased by the Actons on the Deliran listing.

She

testified that she was in the off ice when Andrew and Russell
Acton came in after seeing Bud Bauer, notifying Audrey Lebbon
that there was no legal water on the property.

What

defendants-respondents hoped to show with her testimony was
that Russell or Andrew Acton acknowleoged tnat tl1ey han been
told by Bob Behunin, the Cedar City building inspector, that
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there was an illegal water connection.

The transcript shows

that Behunin testified that he had never said such a thing to
the Actons, and Mrs. Hale's testimony only indicated that she
askeo the Actons if they had been told by Behunin that there
was an illegal water hook-up on their property.

There was no

response from either of the Actons (Tr. 439-441).
Mrs. Hale's testimony does not support
defendants-respondents' contention that the Actons knew about
the water problem prior to closing on the property.

Indeed, it

supports appellants' earlier testimony that they had never seen
the Deliran listing, which did not mention water on it (Tr.
439), and Mrs. Hale admitted that she was in the courtroom when
Behunin testified that he mentioned a water meter problem to
the appellants, but not a water hook-up problem (Tr. 443).
Defendants-respondents then put on Wayne Smith.

Smith

testified that he went on to the property during the survey
being done by David Grimshaw and Russell Acton.

His initial

testimony was that he thought he n1entioned something about the
problem with the water connection on the property, although he
was not certain

(Tr. 468-469).

Throughout the rest of his

testimony, he indicated that he really couldn't remember
specifically what was said; indeed, he said "I - I can't
remember a lot of times what I did last week, and that's a long
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ways back to know exact conversation of what was said on that
day [the day of the survey]" (Tr. 470).

Under erase;

examination, Smith reiterated that he really couldn't ren1ember
what was said on that day (Tr. 473), that he couldn't recall if
certain conversations he had with appellants were before or
after August 12 (the day of the survey) (Tr. 471), and that he
wasn't exactly sure that water was even discussed on that day
(Tr. 474).
Defendants-respondents' final witness was David
Grimshaw, the surveyor.

Grimshaw testified that he didn't

remember the exact words, but thought that Smith mentioned to
Russell Acton that there was a problem with water on the
property.

Grimshaw testified that they didn't make any kind of

a search for a water meter during the course of the survey,
that the only things he was asked to do was locate the four
corners of the property and see if the building was on the
property (Tr. 48b).

Under cross examination, however, Mr.

Grimshaw stated that he did not specifically remember what Mr.
Smith said to Russell Acton, but that he mentioned several
things, including sor:iething about water (Tr. 491-492).

Russell

Acton, called as a rebuttal witness, specifically u1sputed
Grimshaw's recollection and stated that Mr. smith was on the
property for perhaps fifteen r:iinutes our1ng the course of six
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hours of surveying the property, that nothing was said about
11ater by Mr. Snith or Mr. Grimshaw, and that much of the time
he was out surveying the property with Grimshaw, Russell was up
to 25-30 feet away from Grimshaw and Smith, digging for one of
the corner posts on the property (Tr. 495-497).

He

conclusively stated that the only subjects discussed with Mr.
Smith were the boundary lines of the property and the access
problem that resulted from Mr. Smith owning property across the
mouth of the property Russell and Andrew Acton were thinking of
purchasing (Tr. 496-497).
Of the three witnesses called by the
defendants-respondents, Mrs. Hale's testimony only confirmed
that of the appellants.

Mr. Smith's testimony was so uncertain

as to be incompetent, and Mr. Grimshaw only vaguely recollected
something discussed concerning water - a recollection
specifically rebutted by Russell Acton.

Detendants-respondents

put on no other testimony, or any other kind of evidence,
undermining any of the two and one-half days of testimony put
on by appellants' witnesses supporting the contention that
appellants had no idea that there was a problem concerning
water on their property and that they specifically relied upon
the representations, physical, verbal and written, that there
was water on the property.
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II.

Under Utah law, the trial court erred in not
entering a directed verdict, or JUagment not
withstanding the verdict, because there is no
substantial evidence to support the jury verdict.

The most recent statement by the Utah Supreme Court on
judgments not withstanding the verdict is in Gustaveson v.
Gregy, 655 p. 2d 693 ( Ut. 1982 J.

The case involved an assault

upon one bowler by another bowler in a Salt Lake county bowling
alley.

This court concluded that the bowling alley operators

were not liable in any way to the person assaulted, and the
trial court should have grantea a motion for JUdgment
notwithstanding the verdict.

During the course of its opinion,

the court set forth the prevailing Utah case law on the
criteria that must be fulfilled in order to Justify the
granting of a Judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

This court

stated that,
"[T]he granting of a motion for Judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is only
justified if, after looking at the evidence
and all of its reasonable inferences in a
light most favorable to the party moveo
against, the trial court concludes that
there is no competent evidence whicn would
support a verdict in his favor."
Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d at 695.

The court cited several

earlier cases which specifically hold for the same
proposition.

In one of those earlier cases, Koer v. Mayfair

Markets, 19 Ut.2a 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967), the court set forth
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above standard, but stressed that the party against whom a
for Judgment notwithstanding the verdict is made is
only to "all reasonable inferences" (emphasis added),
Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 431 P.2d at 570.

In the Koer case, a

customer shopping at defendant's store allegedly slipped on a
grape and sustained injuries.

She sued for negligence, the

trial court entered a judgment notwithstanding the Jury verdict
in her favor, and she appealed.

This court stated that the

plaintiff-appellant's mere fall did not prima facie establish a
jury question, and that without more evidence, such an
inference that the grape was on the floor, and, therefore, the
employer knew or should have known of its presence, is not
tenable.

Id.
The same analysis applies in the instant case.

out of

a three-day Jury trial, the only testimony proffered by
defendants-respondents that in any way indicates that
appellants had any notice, constructive or actual, that there
was a problem with the legitimacy of the water hookup on the
property they wished to buy is a surveyor who stated that
something having to do with water was discussed by Mr. Smith
when he was on the property during the survey.
not testify to anything

Grimshaw did

specific, such as what was

discussed concerning water, whether the discussion was about a
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water meter, that water came out of the spigot on the property,
or that the water connection was legal or illegal.

Apparently,

upon this slender testimony, the Jury determined that
appellants were not the victims of fraudulent and reckless
misrepresentations, or the victims of mutual mistake, and the
jury returned a verdict upholaing the contract between
appellants and defendants-respondents.

Given this minimal

amount of evidence, and particularly in the face of the wealtil
of testimonial evidence put on by appellants during the course
of the trial, the trial court Juoge's denial of appellants'
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is contrary to
Utah law.

At the trial of this case, appellants presented close
to two and one-half days of testimony concerning the events
surrounding their purchase of the property at issue.

The

tesimony included that of the appellants, that of the agent of
defendant-respondent ERA, and that of various disinterested
parties.

No matter from what source, all of appellants'

witnesses confirmed that appellants had been told that there
was water on the property they purchased; they had seen that
water flowed from a spigot on the property prior to their
purchase; and they had seen what they thought
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correct

!1;
1•0

ting of the proper"y, which stated that there was water on
property.

,,n

The first they learned of a problem with water

property was after they closed on the property.
Given the legal theories upon which appellants founded

their case, fraudulent (reckless) misrepresentation and mutual
mistake, detendants-respondents could compromise appellants'
case by providing evidence of notice, constructive or actual,
to the appellants of a problem with water on the property.

In

the half-day that defendants-respondents put on their entire
uefense, r1une of their witnesses clearly and indisputably
testified that appellants haa such constructive or actual
notice.

one of defendants-respondents' witnesses confirmed the

testimony of appellants' witnesses.

One witness's memory was

so bad that his testimony was practically incompetent, and the
final witness testified to vague recollections about a
uiscussion between Wayne Smith, David Grimshaw and Russell
Acton about water, without any further description of the
conversation.

The Jury returned a verdict against appellants,

refusing to rescind the contract between appellants and
uefendants-reponaents Deliran and Hause.

The trial court judge

denied appellants' motions for a directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, contrary to Utah law.

Appellants

are entitled to a recision of the Real Estate Agreement between
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them and defendants-repondents Deliran and House, and a return
of all monies they have paid on the property to date.

Such a

result is based not only upon sound legal principles, but also
upon the overwhelming weight of evidence presenteu at the trial
in this case.
Respectfully submitted, this 3rd day of January, 1984.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

MAILING CERTIFICATE
On this 3rd day of January, 1984, I hereby certify that
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, two copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellants, to the following parties of
record:
Patrick Fenton, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
J. B. Deliran and Gerald House
154 North Main
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Hans Q.
Esq.
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
ERA Realty Center
110 North Main, Suite G
Cedar City, Utah 84720

2392

